



Bryan Schneider
CFPB Director of Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending Division

Biography & Work Experience

Bryan Schneider Has A B.S. In Accounting, An M.B.A., And A J.D. “Mr. Schneider earned his B.S. in Accounting from Trine University, his M.B.A. from DePaul University and J.D. from the University of Wisconsin Law School.” [[Press Release](#), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 09/25/19]

Dates	Position	Employer	Notes	Source
Sept. 2019 – Present	Associate Director, Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending Division	Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)		Press Release
April 2019 – Oct. 2019	Director of Compliance	Oak Street Health		LinkedIn Profile
Jan. 2019 – Jan. 2019	Attorney	Law Offices of Bryan A. Schneider		LinkedIn Profile
Jan. 2015 – Jan. 2019	Secretary(Cabinet Member)	Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation		LinkedIn Profile
Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2015	Divisional Vice President – Health Law	Walgreen Co.		LinkedIn Profile
Dec. 2008 – Feb. 2010	Director, Healthcare Contracting & Regulatory Law	Walgreen Co.		LinkedIn Profile
Sept. 2005 – Nov. 2008	Director & Legal Counsel, Government Affairs	Walgreen Co.		LinkedIn Profile
July 2004 – Jan. 2015	Member	Illinois State Board of Elections		LinkedIn Profile
May 2000 – Sept. 2005	Senior Attorney	Walgreen Co.		LinkedIn Profile

1997 – 2000		Harris Kessler & Goldstein		Capitol Fax
Jan. 1997 – May 2000	General Counsel	House Republican Caucus, Illinois House of Representatives		LinkedIn Profile
Jan. 1995 – Jan. 1997	General Counsel	Office of the Speaker, Illinois House of Representatives		LinkedIn Profile
Sept. 1993 – Sept. 1997	Associate	Sidley Austin LLP		LinkedIn Profile
Sept. 1992 – Sept. 1993	Law Clerk	U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard Cudahy		LinkedIn Profile

Bryan Schneider, Formerly A Top Executive And Lobbyist For Walgreen Co., Must Answer Whether He Played A Role In The Opioid Crisis

After Serving As Walgreen Co.’s Top Lobbyist For Over Three Years, Bryan Schneider Became A Vice President Of Health Law For The Company, Where He Claims To Have “Collaborated” With Its Lobbying Staff—Who At The Time Were Heavily Lobbying On Issues Surrounding Opioids And The Controlled Substances Act.

While Bryan Schneider Was A “Senior Attorney” For Walgreen Co., He Was An “Exclusive Lobbyist” For The Company From 2001 To 2003, A Lobbyist “Who Advocates For One Entity And One Entity Only.”

From May 2000 To September 2005, Bryan Schneider Was A “Senior Attorney” For Walgreen Co. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/09/19]

In 2001, Bryan Schneider Was Registered With The Illinois Secretary of State As An “Exclusive Lobbyist” For The “Walgreen Company.” [[Lobbyist Information Search for Bryan Schneider](#), Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, accessed 12/09/19]

In 2002, Bryan Schneider Was Registered With The Illinois Secretary of State As An “Exclusive Lobbyist” For The “Walgreen Company.” [[Lobbyist Information Search for Bryan Schneider](#), Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, accessed 12/09/19]

In 2003, Bryan Schneider Was Registered With The Illinois Secretary of State As An “Exclusive Lobbyist” For The “Walgreen Company.” [[Lobbyist Information Search for Bryan Schneider](#), Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, accessed 12/09/19]

In Illinois, “An Exclusive Lobbyist Is A Person Who Advocates For One Entity And One Entity Only.” “First, we need to distinguish between exclusive and contractual lobbyists. An exclusive lobbyist is a person who advocates for one entity and one entity only. An exclusive lobbyist is also referred to as an in-house lobbyist.” [[“Maintaining Visibility in the Governmental Process,”](#) AIA Illinois, accessed 12/09/19]

Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Director Of Government Relations From 2005 To 2008, When He Lobbied On Pharmacy Issues And Claims To Have “Played A Lead Role In Developing Company Strategies” In “Health Care Regulations” And Says He Even “Wrote And Revised Statutory Language.”

While Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Director Of Government Relations, He Claims To Have “Played A Lead Role In Developing Company Strategies Related To Federal And State Reimbursement Guidelines And Health Care Regulations” And “[Written] And Revised Statutory Language.” “Played a lead role in developing company strategies related to federal and state reimbursement guidelines and health care regulations. Developed arguments to justify increased reimbursements. Wrote and revised statutory language. Retained and managed lobbyists. Interacted with public officials and their staffs.” [[Cover Letter and Resume for Bryan A. Schneider](#), State of Florida, 08/12/19]

- **Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Director And Legal Counsel Of Government Affairs From September 2005 To November 2008.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 10/09/19]

Bryan Schneider Lobbied On Pharmacy And Medicare Issues For Walgreen Co. In The First Quarter Of 2008. On behalf of Walgreen Co., Bryan Schneider lobbied the House, Senate, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the first quarter of 2008 on H.R. 2914 the "Medicare IVIG Access Act of 2007" regarding improved access to immune globulins. Sec 4 regarding coverage of home administration of IVIG; Pharmacy enhancements for consideration to the Medicare Modernization Act.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/21/08]

Bryan Schneider Lobbied On Pharmacy And Medicare Issues For Walgreen Co. In The Second Quarter Of 2008. On behalf of Walgreen Co., Bryan Schneider lobbied the House and Senate in the second quarter of 2008 on “Pharmacy enhancements for consideration to the Medicare Modernization Act [...]; H.R. 6331 the ‘Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008’ - Sec. 154 regarding a delay in the competitive acquisition program for DME.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/18/08]

Bryan Schneider Lobbied On Pharmacy And Medicare Issues For Walgreen Co. In The Third Quarter Of 2008. On behalf of Walgreen Co., Bryan Schneider lobbied the House, Senate, and CMS in the third quarter of 2008 on, “H.R. 2914 Medicare IVIG Access Act of 2007 Sec. 4 regarding coverage of home administration of IVIG and reimbursement for services, supplies and equipment; Pharmacy enhancements for consideration to the Medicare Modernization Act no specific legislation this reporting period; H.R. 6331 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 Sec. 154 regarding a delay in the competitive acquisition program for DME.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/17/08]

Following His Time As Walgreen Co.’s Director Of Government Relations, Bryan Schneider Continued To “Collaborat[e]” With Walgreen Co.’s Lobbying Staff In “Developing Policies” While A Vice President For The Company’s Pharmacy, Health, And Wellness Division From 2010 To 2015.

From 2010 To 2015, Bryan Schneider Served As A Vice President For Walgreen Co.’s Pharmacy, Health, And Wellness Legal Division Where He “Collaborated With Government Relations Staff In Developing Policies Concerning Health Care Services.” While Vice President for Walgreen Co.’s Pharmacy, Health, And Wellness Legal Division and Assistant General Counsel from 2010 To 2015, Bryan Schneider claims to have “Collaborated with Government Relations staff in developing policies concerning health care services and reimbursement.” [[Cover Letter and Resume for Bryan A. Schneider](#), State of Florida, 08/12/19]

- **Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Divisional Vice President For Health Law From February 2010 To January 2015.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/09/19]

While Bryan Schneider Was “Developing Policies” With Walgreen Co.’s Lobbying Staff, The Company Lobbied For Eight Straight Quarters On Legislation That Would Have Made “Any Substance Containing Hydrocodone”—An Opioid—“A Schedule II Drug.”

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Legislation That Sought “To Make Any Substance Containing Hydrocodone A Schedule II Drug.” In the fourth quarter of 2014, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on, “S. 621 and H.R. 1285 - the ‘Safe Prescribing Act of 2013,’ all provisions regarding amendment of the Controlled Substances Act to make any substance containing hydrocodone a Schedule II drug.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/20/15]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The First Quarter Of 2014.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/21/14]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The Second Quarter Of 2014.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/21/14]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The Third Quarter Of 2014.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/14]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The First Quarter Of 2013.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/19/13]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The Second Quarter Of 2013.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/22/13]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The Third Quarter of 2013.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/21/13]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 621 And H.R. 1285 In The Fourth Quarter Of 2013.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/21/14]

“Hydrocodone Is A Prescription Opioid Painkiller.” “Hydrocodone is a prescription Opioid painkiller, typically prescribed to treat moderate to severe pain.” [[“What Is Hydrocodone Addiction?”](#), Addiction Center, accessed 12/10/19]

If Enacted, The Safe Prescribing Act Of 2013 Would Have Placed Limits On The Amount Of Hydrocodone Pills That Could Be Prescribed At One Time And Would Also Put Restrictions On Refills. “Buchanan is one of four lawmakers — two Republicans and two Democrats — who introduced the Safe Prescribing Act of 2013. [...] The proposed law would place medications containing hydrocodone in same category as OxyContin, another opiate-based painkiller so potent and addictive that it’s sometimes referred to as synthetic heroin. If enacted, patients would be prescribed fewer hydrocodone pills at one time, and there would be more restrictions on refills. In addition, pharmacies would have to follow stricter procedures for handling and storing the drug.” [Scott Glover and Lisa Girion, [“Bill aims to tighten restrictions on painkiller hydrocodone,”](#) *The Los Angeles Times*, 03/20/12]

During This Period, Walgreens Was Active With The National Association Of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS) As It Directly Urged The Food And Drug Administration (FDA) To “Reject Hydrocodone Rescheduling” After One Of Its Committees Voted To Move The Drug From Schedule III To Schedule II.

In January 2013, The Food And Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Drug Safety And Risk Management Advisory Committee Voted To Recommend Rescheduling Of Hydrocodone From Schedule III To Schedule II. ““FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee voted 19–10 on January 25 to recommend rescheduling of hydrocodone from Schedule III to Schedule II. FDA will now consider its advisory committee’s recommendation in a final recommendation to DEA. Then DEA would have to go through a rulemaking process to propose rescheduling.” [[Hydrocodone shift to Schedule II considered](#),” American Pharmacists Association, 05/01/13]

After The FDA’s Vote, The National Association Of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS) And Other Groups Signed A Letter “Urging FDA To Reject Hydrocodone Rescheduling.” “Following the vote, 18 groups—including the American Society of Consultant Pharmacists, National Association of Chain Drug Stores, and National Community Pharmacists Association—signed a February 1 letter urging FDA to reject hydrocodone rescheduling. ‘No evidence currently exists to show that reclassifying hydrocodone will curb misuse and abuse of pain medications,’ these groups wrote.” [[Hydrocodone shift to Schedule II considered](#),” American Pharmacists Association, 05/01/13]

As Of November 19, 2014 Walgreen Co.’s Debbie B. Garza, RPh Was Listed On The Board Of Directors For The NACDS Foundation. [[Board of Directors](#),” NACDS Foundation via Archive.org, archived November 19, 2014]

- **Debbie B. Garza Was Walgreens’ “Divisional Vice President, Government And Community Relations” From 2007 To 2015.** [[Linkedin Profile for Debbie Garza](#), accessed 12/11/19]

Walgreen Co., Walgreens Boots Alliance Developments GmbH, And Walgreens.com Were All Registered To Participate NACDS’ 2014 Annual Meeting. [[2014 Retailers \(Alphabetical Listing\)](#),” National Association of Chain Drug Stores via Archive.org, archived March 12, 2014]

Walgreen Co. Was Featured In A “Meet The Retailer” Session At The NACDS’ 2014 Annual Meeting. [[Day-By-Day Schedule](#),” National Association of Chain Drug Stores via Archive.org, archived March 11, 2014]

While Bryan Schneider Was “Developing Policies” With Walgreen Co.’s Lobbying Staff, The Company Lobbied On Legislation Related To Dextromethorphan, An Opioid.

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On The Dextromethorphan Abuse Reduction Act of 2009—Dextromethorphan Is An Opioid. In the third quarter of 2010, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “S. 1383 the Dextromethorphan Abuse Reduction Act of 2009 all provisions; regarding amending the Controlled Substances Act to prevent the abuse of dextromethorphan.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/10]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On The Dextromethorphan Abuse Reduction Act of 2009 In The First Quarter Of 2010.** In the first quarter of 2010, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “S. 1383 the Dextromethorphan Abuse Reduction Act of 2009 all provisions; regarding amending the Controlled Substances Act to prevent the abuse of dextromethorphan.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/20/10]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On The House Version Of The Dextromethorphan Distribution Act Of 2009— Dextromethorphan Is An Opioid.** In the first quarter of 2010, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “HR 1259 the Dextromethorphan Distribution Act of 2009 all provisions of the bill; regarding amending the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act to limit the distribution and abuse of DXM.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/20/10]
- **Dextromethorphan (DXM) Is An Opioid.** “DXM [Dextromethorphan] is an opioid without effects on pain reduction and does not act on the opioid receptors. When taken in large doses, DXM causes a depressant effect and sometimes a hallucinogenic effect, similar to PCP and ketamine.” [“[Over-the-Counter Medicines](#),” National Institute on Drug Abuse, December 2017]

While Bryan Schneider Was “Developing Policies” With Walgreen Co.’s Lobbying Staff, The Company Lobbied Heavily On Issues And Legislation Related To The Controlled Substances Act And The Regulation Of Pharmaceutical Supply Chains.

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Legislation Related To “Changes To The Registration Process Under The Controlled Substances Act.” In the third quarter of 2014, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on, “S. 2862 – ‘Regulatory Transparency, Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement [sic] Act of 2014,’ all provisions related to changes to the registration process under the Controlled Substances Act and the report to Congress on the effects of law enforcement activities on patient access to medications.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/14]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Separate Legislation “Related To Changes To The Registration Process Under The Controlled Substances.” In the fourth quarter of 2014, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “H.R. 4709 – the ‘Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2014,’ all provisions related to changes to the registration process under the Controlled Substances Act and the report to Congress on the effects of law enforcement activities on patient access to medications.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/20/15]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 4709 In The Third Quarter of 2014.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/14]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Legislation Related To “The Establishment Of The Combatting Prescription Drug Abuse Working Group” And “Changes To The Registration Process

Under The Controlled Substances Act.” In the first quarter of 2014, Walgreen Co. Lobbied The U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “H.R.4069 - the ‘Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2013,’ all provisions related to changes to the registration process under the Controlled Substances Act and the establishment of the Combatting Prescription Drug Abuse Working Group.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act, 04/21/14]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 4069 In The Second Quarter Of 2014.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/21/14]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On The “Drug Supply Chain Security Act.” In the fourth quarter of 2013, Walgreen Co. hired Blank Rome Government Relations to lobby the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “S. 957 – Drug Supply Chain Security Act.” [[Blank Rome Government Relations LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act, 01/21/14]

- Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 957 In The Second Quarter Of 2013. [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/22/13]
- Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 957 In The Third Quarter Of 2013. [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/21/13]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On The “Pharmaceutical Quality, Security, and Accountability Act.” “In the fourth quarter of 2013, Walgreen Co. hired Blank Rome Government Relations to lobby the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “S. 959 - Pharmaceutical Quality, Security, and Accountability Act.” [[Blank Rome Government Relations LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act, 01/21/14]

- Title II of S. 959, The “Drug Supply Chain Security Act - (Sec. 202) Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish requirements to facilitate the tracing of drug products through the pharmaceutical supply distribution chain.” [[Summary, S.959 - Pharmaceutical Quality, Security, and Accountability Act](#), U.S. Senate, 05/15/13]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On “Disclosures And Audit Protections” For Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Which Can “Develop And Enforce Prescribing And Dispensing Guidelines” For Opioid Usage In Employer Health Plans. In the first quarter of 2013, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on, “issues related to Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBM) activities around disclosures and audit protections.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/19/13]

- **Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Who Administer Employer Health Plan Benefits, “Evaluate The Employer’s Opioid Utilization Data And Will Develop And Enforce Prescribing And Dispensing Guidelines To Ensure Safe Medication Use.”** “Comprehensive employer health plans typically include pharmacy benefits, often administered by third parties, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs). PBMs collect important prescription use data dispensed through both mail service and retail pharmacies and administer a health plan’s drug formulary. A formulary is a list of ‘preferred’ drugs approved by your health plan. For some drugs such as opioid

painkillers, the PBM will evaluate the employer's opioid utilization data and will develop and enforce prescribing and dispensing guidelines to ensure safe medication use or to control plan costs. These guidelines may include prior authorization approvals before dispensing by the pharmacy." [[Managing opioid prescribing and use through pharmacy benefit programs](#)," National Safety Council, accessed 12/10/19]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On "A Bill To Amend The Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act With Respect To The Pharmaceutical Distribution Supply Chain." In the second quarter of 2013, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on "H.R. 1919 - the 'Safeguarding America's Pharmaceuticals Act Of 2013,' a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act with respect to the pharmaceutical distribution supply chain, and for other purposes." [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/22/13]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 1919 In The Third Quarter Of 2013.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/21/13]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Issues Related To A "Drug Identification And Tracking System." In the fourth quarter of 2012, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on "issues relating to regulations that would establish an effective drug identification and tracking system through which drug manufacturers, repackagers, wholesale distributors and dispensers may authenticate the wholesale distribution history of any prescription drug that is subject to a requirement for a standardized numerical identifier." [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/18/13]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On This Issue In The Third Quarter of 2012.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/22/12]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On "All Provisions" Of The Safeguarding America's Pharmaceuticals Act, Which The Bill's Author Later Asked In 2017 If It Helped The FDA Identify The Illicit Distribution Of Opioid Drugs. In first quarter of 2012, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on "H.R. 3026 - the 'Safeguarding America's Pharmaceutical [sic] Act,' all provisions; requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations to establish an effective drug identification and tracking system through which drug manufacturers, repackagers, wholesale distributors, and dispensers may authenticate the wholesale distribution history of any prescription drug that is subject to a requirement for a standardized numerical identifier." [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/20/12]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 3026 In The Third Quarter Of 2012.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/22/12]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 3026 In The Fourth Quarter Of 2011.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/20/12]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On H.R. 3026 In The Third Quarter Of 2011.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/11]

- **In 2017, The Author Of The Safeguarding America’s Pharmaceuticals Act Asked The Federal Drug Administration “Whether They Have The Necessary Tools To Identify Diverted Prescription Opioids.”** “The Safeguarding America’s Pharmaceuticals Act was authored by Latta and was signed into law in 2013 as part of the Drug Quality and Security Act. Under the law, FDA is directed to set up a system to follow prescription drugs through the supply chain in order to protect Americans against counterfeit and otherwise illegitimate drugs. In a letter, Latta asks FDA whether they have the necessary tools to identify diverted prescription opioids, whether they recommend Congress provide them additional authority to track and trace diverted drugs, what potential changes could be made to protect consumers, and whether the use of blockchain technology to monitor prescription drugs has been considered by the agency.” [[Press Release](#), Rep. Bob Latta, 12/06/17]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On Legislation That Would Have Permitted HHS To Require “Each Registered Drug Producer To Report On Each Producer, Manufacturer, Distributor, And Shipper Involved In The Production Of A Drug Or The Production Or Transport Of The Active Ingredients Of A Drug.” In the first quarter of 2012, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House and U.S. Senate on “S. 1584 - the ‘Drug Safety and Accountability Act,’ all provisions; authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to order an establishment to promptly revise its quality management plan in response to a significant threat to public health and requires each registered drug producer to report on each producer, manufacturer, distributor, and shipper involved in the production of a drug or the production or transport of the active ingredients of a drug[;] requires the Secretary to develop and maintain information systems to track and assess every establishment that is involved in the manufacturing, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or active ingredient of a drug.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/20/12]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 1584 In The Fourth Quarter In 2011.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 01/20/12]
- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On S. 1584 In the Third Quarter Of 2011.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/11]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On “Any Discussions Surrounding The Security Of The Drug Supply Chain.” In the first quarter of 2011, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House And U.S. Senate on “any discussions surrounding the security of the drug supply chain.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/19/11]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On This Issue In The Second Quarter Of 2011.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 07/20/11]

Walgreen Co. Lobbied On “The Need For The DEA To Publish Rules That Would Allow For Electronic Prescribing Of Controlled Substances.” In the first quarter of 2010, Walgreen Co. lobbied the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and Executive Office of the President on “the need for the DEA to publish rules that would allow for electronic prescribing of controlled substances no

specific legislation.” [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 04/20/10]

- **Walgreen Co. Also Lobbied On This Issue In The Third Quarter Of 2010.** [[Walgreen Co. LD-2 Disclosure Form](#), U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, 10/20/10]

While Bryan Schneider Held Responsibility For Walgreens’ “Compliance Strategies,” The Company Allegedly Pursued “A General Conspiratorial Objective [...] To Expand The Opioid Market And Disregard Regulatory Obligations,” While Fueling An Overdose Crisis Which “Kills More Than 100 Americans Daily”—Walgreens Now Could Be Part Of “The Biggest Civil Trial In US History” For Its Conduct During The Opioid Crisis.

In What Could Be “The Biggest Civil Trial In US History,” 2,000 Cities And Counties Have Filed Claims Against Walgreens, Cardinal Health, And Other Companies In The Opioid Business For Having “Fueled” A Crisis That “Kills More Than 100 Americans Daily” And Has Killed More Than 400,000.

Walgreen Boots Alliance And Cardinal Health Are Among Several Companies Subject To Claims “By More Than 2,000 U.S. Cities And Counties [...] They Fueled An Opioid Crisis That Kills More Than 100 American Daily.” “The ruling clears the way for J&J, Cardinal Health, Walgreens and other companies to face a federal court jury in Cleveland Oct. 21 on claims—by more than 2,000 U.S. cities and counties—they fueled an opioid crisis that kills more than 100 Americans daily.” [Jef Feeley, “[J&J, Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules](#),” *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

- **Walgreens Boots Alliance Is The Holding Company For Walgreens, Duane Reade And Alliance Healthcare.** “Walgreens Boots Alliance (Nasdaq: WBA) is a global leader in retail and wholesale pharmacy, touching millions of lives every day through dispensing and distributing medicines, its convenient retail locations, digital platforms and health and beauty products. [...] The Company’s portfolio of retail and business brands includes Walgreens, Duane Reade, Boots and Alliance Healthcare, as well as increasingly global health and beauty product brands, such as No7, Soap & Glory, Liz Earle, Botanics, Sleek MakeUP and YourGoodSkin.” [“[About Us](#),” Walgreens boots Alliance, accessed 12/10/19]

Opioid Manufacturers And Distributors Are Being Sued And Blamed For “Starting And Sustaining The Opioid Epidemic That Has Killed More Than 400,000 Americans. “Cardinal Health is among the 10 opioid manufacturers and distributors facing more than 1,600 lawsuits blaming them for starting and sustaining the opioid epidemic that has killed more than

400,000 Americans.” [Laura Strickler, “[Document shows drug firm knew in 2008 it was shipping large amounts of opioids](#),” *NBC News*, 06/21/19]

“The Lawsuit Is Expected To Go To Trial — The Biggest Civil Trial In US History [...] In October.” [Stephanie Grob Plante, “[Walmart and CVS are among the retailers being sued for aiding the spread of opioids](#),” *Vox*, 07/23/19]

Walgreens Was Once The “Nation’s Second-Largest Distributor Of Opioids” And “Held 16.5% Of The Oxycodone And Hydrocodone Market From 2006 To 2012.”

Walgreens Is The “Nation’s Second-Largest Distributor Of Opioids” And Has Sold More Than 700 Million Opioid Pills. “After being made, the pills are distributed by companies to retail pharmacies, where they’re sold to patients, many of whom become addicted. Many of the pills — more than 700 million, to be exact — were distributed by Deerfield-based Walgreen’s, the nation’s second-largest distributor of opioids. Many were also sold by Walgreens’ retail stores, as well as at thousands of other storefront pharmacies in communities seemingly everywhere.” [Christopher Hacker, “[Nearly 2 Billion Opioid Pills Flowed Into Illinois, Data Shows](#),” *CBS Chicago*, 07/19/19]

Walgreens Distributed 13 Billion Opioid Pills And Held 16.5% Of The Oxycodone And Hydrocodone Market From 2006 To 2012. “Walgreens ranked second among distributors in the nation, with 13 billion pills and 16.5 percent of the market for oxycodone and hydrocodone from 2006 through 2012, the DEA database shows.” [Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz and Steven Rich, “[Internal drug company emails show indifference to opioid epidemic](#),” *The Washington Post*, 07/19/19]

Walgreens Claims It “Has Not Distributed Prescription Controlled Substances Since 2014 [...]” “In a statement provided to Vox, Walgreens spokesperson Phil Caruso said, ‘Walgreens pharmacists are highly trained professionals committed to dispensing legitimate prescriptions that meet the needs of our patients. Walgreens has not distributed prescription controlled substances since 2014 and before that time only distributed to our chain of pharmacies.’” [Stephanie Grob Plante, “[Walmart and CVS are among the retailers being sued for aiding the spread of opioids](#),” *Vox*, 07/23/19]

From 2010 To 2015, Bryan Schneider Was Walgreens Co.’s Divisional Vice President For Health Law And Worked To “Advise Senior Executives,” “Execute Strategies That Move Agreements To Conclusion,” And “Communicate With Regulators To Identify Compliance Strategies That Achieve Corporate Objectives.”

Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Divisional Vice President For Health Law From February 2010 To January 2015. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

In This Role, Bryan Schneider Claimed He Worked To “Execute Strategies That Move Agreements To Conclusion” And “Communicate With Regulators To Identify Compliance

Strategies That Achieve Corporate Objectives.” “Execute strategies that move agreements to conclusion with limited risk to the company. Communicate with regulators to identify compliance strategies that achieve corporate objectives.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Also Held “Corporate Counsel” Duties Such As Advising Senior Executives. Bryan Schneider claimed his “Corporate Counsel” responsibilities were to, “advise senior executives as one of two legal vice presidents reporting directly to the General Counsel at the largest retail, infusion, and specialty pharmacy provider in the U.S. with responsibility for a portfolio that impacts more than 70% of annual sales (\$50 billion), including large and growing medical service reimbursement.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Was On A 2013 Email Chain With Walgreen Co.’s Top Pharmacy, Supply Chain, And Legal Executives About The Company’s Transition Away From Cardinal Health As Its Distributor For Schedule II Drugs—Which Include Opioids—And Sourcing Pharmaceuticals For Itself.

Bryan Schneider Is Copied On A 2013 Email From Walgreen Co.’s Pharmacy President About A Letter From Cardinal Health Concerning Walgreen’s Changing Its Distributor For Schedule II (CII) Drugs, Which Include Opioids. Bryan Schneider Is copied on an email from Walgreen Co.’s President of Pharmacy, Health and Wellness Kermit Crawford concerning a letter from Cardinal Health about the “transition of Schedule II Legend Drugs (‘CIIs’) on a primary basis from Cardinal Health to an alternate distributor.” [[Document 2205-38, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation](#), Case No. 1:17-md-02804]

- **Schedule (CII) Narcotics Include Opium, Morphine, Methadone, Oxycodone, And Fentanyl.** “Some examples of CII narcotics are: opium, morphine, codeine, hydromorphone (Dilaudid), methadone, meperidine (Demerol), cocaine, oxycodone (Percodan), anileridine (Lertine), the immediate precursor phenylacetone (P-2-P), and oxymorphone (Numorphan) [...] and fentanyl (Sublimaze)” [[“Controlled Substances Security Manual,”](#) U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, accessed 10/09/19]

Alongside Bryan Schneider, Other Top Walgreens Executives Were Copied On The Email, Including Two Who Focused On The Company’s “Supply Chain.” [[Document 2205-38, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation](#), Case No. 1:17-md-02804]

- **Thomas Sabatino Was Walgreens’ “Executive Vice President, General Counsel And Secretary” From September 2011 To April 2014.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Thomas Sabatino](#), accessed 12/10/19]
- **Frank DeStefano Was Walgreens’ “Group Vice President, Pharmacy Purchasing And Supply Chain” From April 2004 To July 2013.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Frank DeStefano](#), accessed 12/10/19]

- **Jan Reed Was Walgreens’ “Senior Vice President And General Counsel” From February 2013 To February 2016.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Jan Stern Reed](#), accessed 12/09/19]
- **Mike Bleser Has Been Walgreens’ “Division Vice President, Generic Rx Purchasing & Rx Supply Chain” Since 1993.** [[LinkedIn Profile for Mike Bleser](#), accessed 12/09/19]

Cardinal Health’s Letter Also Included A Potential “Wind-Down” Of Its “Overall Relationship” With Walgreen Co.—The Two Companies Officially Ended Their Contract In August 2013. The letter also said, “Separately, we have discussed and agreed to amend certain aspects of our existing distribution agreements to contemplate the wind-down of our overall distribution relationship on August 31, 2013.” [[Document 2205-38, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation](#), Case No. 1:17-md-02804]

- **In March 2013, Cardinal Health Publicly Announced Its “Pharmaceutical Distribution Contract” With Walgreen Co. Would End In August 2013.** On March 19, 2013, “Cardinal Health announced [...] that its pharmaceutical distribution contract with Walgreen Co. (Walgreens), which is scheduled to expire at the end of August 2013, will not be renewed.” [[“Pharmaceutical Distribution Agreement Between Cardinal Health And Walgreens To End August 2013,” PR Newswire](#), 03/19/13]

As Early As June 2012, There Had Been Speculation That Walgreen Co. Would Sever Ties With Cardinal Health To “Source Branded Drugs Directly” For Itself. “On Monday, a Cleveland Research report publicized something that many of us already know: ‘Walgreen’s (NYSE:WAG) may be looking to bypass Cardinal Health (NYSE:CAH) in order to source branded drugs directly and that the Boots acquisition may help support the initiative.’” [Adam J. Fein, [“Will Walgreens bypass Cardinal Health?”](#), *Drug Channels*, 06/27/12]

In 2019, A Federal Judge Ruled That Juries Should Weigh Whether Walgreen Boots Alliance, Formerly Walgreen Co., Undertook “Coordinated Efforts” From 2012 To 2016 To “Commit ‘Unlawful Acts’ In The Marketing, Delivering, And Selling Of Opioids.”

In September 2019, The “First Federal Trial” Over Opioids Began To Move Forward. “Johnson & Johnson, Cardinal Health, and other makers and distributors of opioid painkillers must face lawsuits claiming they banded together to wrongfully push sales of the addictive pills, a judge ruled as the first federal trial over the medicines looms next month.” [Jef Feeley, [“J&J, Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules,”](#) *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

In 2019, A Federal Judge Ruled That “Juries Must Decide Whether To Hold Companies Like Pharmacy Chain Walgreens Boots Alliance Liable For Undertaking ‘Coordinated Efforts’ To Commit ‘Unlawful Acts’ In The Marketing, Delivering, And Selling Of Opioids.” “U.S. District Judge Dan Polster ruled [...] that juries must decide whether to hold companies like pharmacy chain Walgreens Boots Alliance liable for undertaking ‘coordinated efforts’ to commit ‘unlawful acts’ in the marketing, delivering, and selling of opioids.” [Jef Feeley, [“J&J,](#)

[Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules,](#) *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

- **Walgreen Co. Was Walgreens Boots Alliance’s “Predecessor Company.”**
“Walgreens Boots Alliance is included in Fortune magazine’s 2019 list of the World’s Most Admired Companies and ranked first in the food and drugstore category. This is the 26th consecutive year that Walgreens Boots Alliance or its predecessor company, Walgreen Co., has been named to the list.” [[“About Us,”](#) Walgreens Boots Alliance, accessed 12/09/19]

From 2012 To 2016, Walgreen Co. And Cardinal Health “Agreed To Manipulate The Timing And Delivery Of Opioid Orders,” With Cardinal Giving “Advance Notice To Walgreens Of Due Diligence Site Visits, In Order To Avoid Reporting Suspicious Orders To The DEA.” “Between 2012 and 2016, Cardinal and Walgreens agreed to manipulate the timing and delivery of opioid orders,’ Polster wrote in his review of the evidence. Cardinal officials also ‘provided advance notice to Walgreens of due diligence site visits, in order to avoid reporting suspicious orders to the DEA,’ he said.” [Jef Feeley, [“J&J, Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules,”](#) *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

The Federal Judge Suggested That Walgreens And Cardinal Health “Shared A General Conspiratorial Objective [...] To Expand The Opioid Market And Disregard Regulatory Obligations.”

The Federal Judge Said, **“A Reasonable Jury Could [...] Find That Distributor Defendants Shared A General Conspiratorial Objective [...] To Expand The Opioid Market And Disregard Regulatory Obligations.”** ““A reasonable jury could review the record evidence and find that distributor defendants shared a general conspiratorial objective, with themselves and with other defendants, to expand the opioid market and disregard regulatory obligations in order to achieve that goal,’ the judge wrote.” [Jef Feeley, [“J&J, Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules,”](#) *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

The Federal Judge Suggested That Walgreens Executives Worked To “Reroute” Supplies To Keep Stores Stocked With Opioids When They Learned The DEA “Might Shutter” One Of Its Distribution Facilities In 2013.

In 2013, Walgreens Executives Learned That The DEA “Might Shutter One Of Its Ohio Distribution Centers” And They Started To “Reroute” Supplies Through Another Opioid Distributor **“To Keep Pharmacy Shelves Stocked.”** “When Walgreens executives learned in 2013 that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration might shutter one of its Ohio distribution centers, they started working with officials at Mallinckrodt, another opioid distributor, ‘to reroute Walgreens’s opioid supply through other distributors’ to keep pharmacy shelves stocked, Polster wrote.” [Jef Feeley, [“J&J, Walgreens, and Others Must Face Lawsuits Claiming Conspiracy to Push Opioids, Judge Rules,”](#) *Fortune*, 09/03/19]

In 2012, The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Said “Walgreens Has Failed To Maintain An Adequate Suspicious Order Reporting System And As A Result, Has Ignored Readily Identifiable Orders And Ordering Patterns” That Should Have Been Reported.

In 2012, The DEA Wrote In A Suspension Order Against Walgreens That It Had “Has Failed To Maintain An Adequate Suspicious Order Reporting System And As A Result, Ha[d] Ignored Readily Identifiable Orders And Ordering Patterns That, Based On The Information Available Throughout The Walgreens Corporation, Should Have Been Obvious Signs Of Diversion.” “‘Suspicious orders are to be reported *as discovered*, not in a collection of monthly completed transactions,’ the DEA wrote in an immediate suspension order issued against Walgreens in 2012. ‘Notwithstanding the ample guidance available, Walgreens has failed to maintain an adequate suspicious order reporting system and as a result, has ignored readily identifiable orders and ordering patterns that, based on the information available throughout the Walgreens Corporation, should have been obvious signs of diversion.’” [Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Steven Rich, “[Internal drug company emails show indifference to opioid epidemic](#),” *The Washington Post*, 07/19/19]

- **“Diversion” Is The Term The DEA Uses For The Illegitimate Distribution Of Drugs And Substances.** “The mission of DEA’s Diversion Control Division is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate sources while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply for legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs.” [“[Diversion Control Division](#),” U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, accessed 12/10/19]

Opioid-Related Deaths In Illinois Had Begun To Spike By 70% In The Time Bryan Schneider Moved From Handling “Compliance Strategies” At Walgreens To Becoming Illinois’ Secretary Of Financial And Professional Regulation, Where He Oversaw “All Health Care Professionals Practicing In Illinois,” Including Pharmacists.

Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Director Of Healthcare Regulatory Law From 2008 To 2010, With “Increased Responsibility For Regulatory Compliance And Transactions,” And Then The Company’s Health Law Vice President, Responsible For “Compliance Strategies” From 2010 To 2015.

Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Director Of Healthcare Contracting And Regulatory Law From December 2008 To February 2010. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

- “Held leadership positions with increased responsibility for regulatory compliance and transactions. Managed teams of lawyers and staff. Hired new employees and evaluated performance.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Was Walgreen Co.’s Divisional Vice President For Health Law From February 2010 To January 2015. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

- Bryan Schneider claimed his “Corporate Counsel” responsibilities were to, “advise senior executives as one of two legal vice presidents reporting directly to the General Counsel at the largest retail, infusion, and specialty pharmacy provider in the U.S. with responsibility for a portfolio that impacts more than 70% of annual sales (\$50 billion), including large and growing medical service reimbursement.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]
- “Execute strategies that move agreements to conclusion with limited risk to the company. Communicate with regulators to identify compliance strategies that achieve corporate objectives.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]
- “Review messaging and marketing collateral to mitigate legal risk.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Immediately After Working For Walgreens, Bryan Schneider Became Secretary Of The Illinois Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation (IDFPR), Where He Oversaw “All Health Care Professionals Practicing In Illinois,” Including Controlled Substance Pharmacies.

Bryan Schneider Was Secretary Of The Illinois Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation (IDFPR) From January 2015 To January 2019. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Claims To Have Been Responsible For “Regulatory And Licensure Oversight” Of “More Than 250 Professions, 1.2 Million Licensees Including All Health Care Professionals Practicing In Illinois.” “Serve as agency head and member of Governor’s Cabinet. Lead department of more than 450 team members with an annual budget of more than \$100 million. Responsible for regulatory and licensure oversight of all Illinois state-chartered banks, credit unions, and non-depository financial institutions together with more than 250 professions, representing 1.2 million licensees including all health care professionals practicing in Illinois.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider’s Resume Notes That He Was “Responsible For Regulatory And Licensure Oversight” Of “Physicians, Nurses, Pharmacists, [And] Pharmacies,” Amongst Other Licensed Professions. “Responsible for regulatory and licensure oversight of more than 4,000 state-chartered banks, credit unions, and non-depository financial institutions, together with more than 250 professions, representing 1.1 million licensees, including physicians, nurses,

pharmacists, pharmacies, and medical cannabis dispensaries.” [[Cover Letter and Resume for Bryan A. Schneider](#), State of Florida, 08/12/19]

IDFPR Licenses Pharmacies And Pharmacists, Including Controlled Substance Pharmacies. The “Pharmacy Professions Licensed By IDFPR” Include, “Pharmacy,” “Pharmacists, Registered,” Pharmacy Technician, Registered,” And “Pharmacy Controlled Substance.” [[Pharmacy](#),” Illinois Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation, 10/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Touts The Fact That He Cut His Agency’s Budget By \$2 Million In His First 90 Days As Secretary.

Bryan Schneider Emphasizes That He “Eliminated \$2 Million In Unnecessary Agency Spending In [His] First 90 Days.” “Eliminated approximately \$2 million in unnecessary agency spending in first 90 days.” [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

As IDFPR Secretary, Bryan Schneider Was Given A Role In The State’s “Opioid Action Plan,” Was A Member Of The Illinois Opioid Crisis Response Advisory Council, And Had Power To Hold Healthcare Providers Responsible Under The Illinois Prescription Monitoring Program.

While IDFPR Secretary, Bryan Schneider Was A Member of The Illinois Opioid Crisis Response Advisory Council As Early As September 2017. [[State of Illinois Opioid Action Plan](#),” State of Illinois Department of Insurance, September 2017, accessed 12/10/19]

IDFPR Was Among The “Participating State Agencies” In Illinois’ Opioid Action Plan. [[State of Illinois Opioid Action Plan](#),” State of Illinois Department of Insurance, September 2017, accessed 12/10/19]

The IDFPR “Is Generally Authorized To Take Disciplinary Or Non-Disciplinary Enforcement Action Against Any Prescriber For Failure To Comply” With The Illinois Prescription Monitoring Program. “The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) is generally authorized to take disciplinary or non-disciplinary enforcement action against any prescriber for failure to comply. Instances of non-compliance will be handled on a case-by-case basis. The IDFPR encourages early compliance, and will enforce new requirements to assist in the goal of reducing opioid abuse and overdose.” [[Prescription Monitoring Program: Frequently Asked Questions](#),” Illinois Prescription Monitoring Program, accessed 12/10/19]

As Part Of The Illinois’ Heroin Crisis Act, The Prescription Monitoring Program Required All Prescribers To “Renew Their Controlled Substance Licenses” With The IDFPR. “With the passage of the Heroin Crisis Act, registration with the ILPMP [Illinois Prescription Monitoring Program] is now required when prescribers renew their controlled substance licenses with the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR). Use of the ILPMP is still

voluntary.” [[“State of Illinois Opioid Action Plan,”](#) State of Illinois Department of Insurance, September 2017, accessed 12/10/19]

Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths In Illinois, Where Walgreens Is Based, Spiked By More Than 70% From 2013 To 2016—And The State Estimated That As Many As 338,000 Illinoisans Had Opioid Use Disorder In 2017.

Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths In Illinois Had Risen By More Than 70 Percent From 2013 To 2016. “The 1,826 opioid- related overdose deaths represents an over 70 percent increase in the number of such deaths that were reported in 2013, and a 32.1 percent increase over the 1,382 opioid-related overdose that were reported by IDPH for 2015.” [[“The Opioid Crisis in Illinois,”](#) State of Illinois Department of Human Services, accessed 12/10/19]

Using Statistics From The Centers From Disease Control And The World Health Organization, The Illinois’ Department Of Human Services Found That Between 286,000 And 338,000 People In Illinois Were Likely To Have Opioid Use Disorder In 2017. “Based on their review of multiple national databases, the CDC concluded that for every opioid overdose death there are 130 individuals with an opioid use disorder (OUD) per DSM-5 diagnostic criteria. Applying this factor to Illinois, it can be estimated that there are about 286,000 persons with an OUD. An even higher estimate is obtained applying a World Health Organization (WHO) estimate an annual incidence rate of .65% of fatal overdoses per opioid dependent individuals. This translates into a population estimate of 338,769 Illinois residents with an OUD.” [[“The Opioid Crisis In Illinois: Data And The State’s Response,”](#) State of Illinois Department of Human Services, accessed 12/10/19]

Walgreens Is Based In Deerfield, Illinois. “Deerfield, Ill.-based Walgreens operates more than 9,500 drugstores.” [[“More Retailers Cease the Sale of E-Cigarettes,”](#) *Convenience Store News*, 10/08/19]

From 2006 To 2012, Nearly 2 Billion Prescription Painkillers Made Their Way Through Illinois, Killing Nearly 5,000 In The State Through That Time.

From 2006 To 2012, “Close To 2 Billion Prescription Painkillers Were Distributed To Illinois” – “Nearly 180 Pills For Every Single Person In The State.” “Close to 2 billion prescription painkillers were distributed to Illinois between 2006 and 2012, according to new data released by The Washington Post. Yes, billion — enough for nearly 180 pills for every single person in the state.” [Christopher Hacker, “[Nearly 2 Billion Opioid Pills Flowed Into Illinois, Data Shows,](#)” *CBS Chicago*, 07/19/19]

From 2006 To 2012, The Opioid Epidemic “Killed Nearly 5,000 Across Illinois,” With “Many More” Suffering Overdoses And Addiction. “That epidemic killed nearly 5,000 people across Illinois from 2006 to 2012 — enough to fill more than 30 commercial airplanes, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Many more have suffered overdoses,

and more still have become addicted to opioid medications.” [Christopher Hacker, “[Nearly 2 Billion Opioid Pills Flowed Into Illinois, Data Shows,](#)” *CBS Chicago*, 07/19/19]

Bryan Schneider Has Called For Looser Regulations On Fintech Companies Despite Concerns About Lending Discrimination By This Industry

While Secretary Of The Illinois Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation, Bryan Schneider Announced His Department Would Establish A Fintech Sandbox As He Complained About Industry Being “Restrained By A Regulatory Regime.”

In 2018, Brian Schneider Announced His Department Would Establish “A Sandbox Of Some Kind” For Fintechs As He Complained About Industry Being “Restrained By A Regulatory Regime” And Touted Illinois’ “Regulatory Flexibility.”

In 2018, Bryan Schneider Complained About Industry Being “Restrained By A Regulatory Regime” As He Claimed His Department Was Going To Establish “A Sandbox Of Some Kind” In Illinois. “Schneider said that his department was going to try to set up a sandbox of some kind in Illinois. The first step is to build a dialog around the idea, said Schneider, as introduction of a state sandbox would require legislative approval by the state legislature. ‘Time is not your friend if you are innovating and being restrained by a regulatory regime—which almost always by definition is looking at yesterday’s issues,’ said Schneider.” [Steve Cocheo, “[Fintech, regtech, and supertech meet state regulatory system,](#)” *Banking Exchange*, 01/16/18]

In 2018, Bryan Schneider Claimed Illinois Is “The Natural Home For Fintech Companies Due To A Collaborative Regulatory Ecosystem” As He Planned To “Encourage More Fintech Companies To Establish Themselves” There. “In an exclusive interview; Bryan Schneider, Secretary at Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation explains how Illinois is the natural home for fintech companies due to a collaborative regulatory ecosystem. He plans to bring in further reforms that will encourage more fintech companies to establish themselves in Illinois.” [George Popescu, “[Illinois Department of Financial Regulation’s Secretary Schneider encourages and supports innovation,](#)” *Lending Times*, 11/03/16]

Bryan Schneider Said, “Regulatory Flexibility Will Help People Get Products And Services To Market More Quickly.” “Time is not your friend if you are innovating and being restrained by a regulatory regime—which almost always by definition is looking at yesterday’s issues,’ said Schneider. ‘Some regulatory flexibility will help people get products and services to market more quickly. I think that’s good for Illinoisans. Part of my job is not to just keep bad

things away from Illinoisans but to also make sure that they get *good* things as quickly as possible.” [Steve Cocheo, “[Fintech, regtech, and supertech meet state regulatory system](#),” *Banking Exchange*, 01/16/18]

As Of 2018, Illinois Already Had “One Of The Highest Number Of State-Regulated Fintechs” Due To Its Accommodating Regulatory Environment.

As Of 2018, Illinois Had “One Of The Highest Number Of State-Regulated Fintechs” Due To An Accommodating Regulatory Framework. “The state already has one of the highest number of state-regulated fintechs, banks and credit unions and same goes for non-depository institutions like mortgage banking, origination, servicing etc. Because of its flexible, reasonable, and balanced regulatory framework, Illinois has the most depository institutions of any state and the state plans to help emerging start-ups to encourage economic activity in Illinois.”

[George Popescu, “[Illinois Department of Financial Regulation’s Secretary Schneider encourages and supports innovation](#),” *Lending Times*, 11/03/16]

Bryan Schneider Was A Leader At A Major State Bank Supervisor Group That Had Previously “Announced A Raft Of Measures” To Give Fintech Companies “Welcome Relief” In Complying With Oversight.

Bryan Schneider Held Chair Positions For The Conference Of Bank Supervisors’ (CSBS) Innovation Task Force And Its Committee To Coordinate Supervision Between States And The CFPB — CSBS Members “Supervise Roughly Three-Quarters Of All U.S. Banks.”

Bryan Schneider Was “Secretary (Cabinet Member)” Of The Illinois Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation From January 2015 To January 2019. [[LinkedIn Profile for Bryan Schneider](#), accessed 12/10/19]

Bryan Schneider Represented The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), Whose Membership “Supervise Roughly Three-Quarters Of All U.S. Banks,” In Testimony Before A House Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing In February 2018. “Today, I represent my colleagues on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), the nationwide organization of banking regulators from all 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. State regulators supervise roughly three-quarters of all U.S. banks and a variety of non-bank financial services.” [[Testimony of Bryan A. Schneider, Examining De-Risking and its effect on Access to Financial Services](#), House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit, 02/15/18]

Bryan Schneider Was Chair Of CSBS’ “Emerging Payments And Innovation Task Force” And Chair Of Its “State Coordinating Committee, Which Is Responsible For Coordinating Supervision Between The States And The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).” “I currently serve as chair of the CSBS Emerging Payments and Innovation Task Force, which addresses fintech issues, as well as the chair of the State Coordinating Committee, which is responsible for coordinating supervision between the states and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).” [[Testimony of Bryan A. Schneider, Examining De-Risking and its effect on Access to Financial Services](#), House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit, 02/15/18]

Shortly Before Bryan Schneider Was On The CSBS Fintech Task Force, Schneider “Called For The Creation Of A Fintech Advisory Group” As The Group “Announced A Raft Of Measures” To “Simplify” Fintech Oversight And Provide “Welcome Relief” For Companies.

In April 2017, *American Banker* Reported That Bryan Schneider “Called For The Creation Of A Fintech Advisory Group To Encourage Discussions Among States.” “Some states have been more vocal than others in advocating better coordination on fintech issues, particularly in response to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s plan to create limited-purpose bank charter for fintech firms. [...] The top financial regulator in Illinois, Bryan Schneider, has also called for the creation of a fintech advisory group to encourage discussions among states.” [Lalita Clozel, “[State regulators harmonize quarterly reporting for MSBs](#),” *American Banker*, 04/18/17]

- **Bryan Schneider Was Chair Of CSBS’ Task Force On Emerging Payments And Innovation Task Force As Early As September 2017.** [“[On Financial Innovation Symposium hosted by Western States Financial Regulators](#),” Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 09/01/17]

In April 2017, CSBS “Announced A Raft Of Measures Tuesday Designed To Simplify Multistate Licensing And Regulatory Oversight For Fintechs” And Money-Services Businesses. “The Conference of State Bank Supervisors announced a raft of measures [...] designed to simplify multistate licensing and regulatory oversight for fintechs and other companies registered as money-services businesses.” [Lalita Clozel, “[State regulators harmonize quarterly reporting for MSBs](#),” *American Banker*, 04/18/17]

The Measures Seemed To Be “Welcome Relief For Companies Involved In Money Transfers” And Others. “The changes appear to be a welcome relief for companies involved in money transfers and others that have to obtain MSB licenses from each state where they plan to do business.” [Lalita Clozel, “[State regulators harmonize quarterly reporting for MSBs](#),” *American Banker*, 04/18/17]

Fintech Companies Have Been Criticized For Using Algorithms That “Can Result In Discriminatory Lending Outcomes And Overcharge Borrowers.”

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) Wrote To Federal Financial Regulators Demanding To Know How They Intend To Regulate Fintech Following A Study Showing That The Algorithms Many Firms Rely On “Can Result In Discriminatory Lending Outcomes And Overcharge Borrowers.”

In June 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) Cited A Study Showing That “Algorithmic Models Used By Financial Technology (Fintech) Companies Can Result In Discriminatory Lending Outcomes And Overcharge Borrowers” In A Letter To Federal Financial Regulators. “U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), a member of the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, sent a letter to Chairman Jerome Powell at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Comptroller Joseph Otting at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Chairman Jelena McWilliams at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Director Kathy Kraninger at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, regarding a recently-released analysis which found that the algorithmic models used by financial technology (FinTech) companies can result in discriminatory lending outcomes and overcharge borrowers. Senator Warren is seeking information about the role that the banking agencies can play in ensuring that lending algorithms serve American borrowers on a nondiscriminatory and fair basis.” [[Press Release](#), Sen. Elizabeth Warren, 06/12/19]

The Study Found “‘Fintech Lenders [Using Algorithms] Charge Latinx/African American Borrowers 6-9 Basis Points Higher Interest Rates’ Than Comparable Borrowers – Which Is Almost Identical To The Interest Rate Premium That Minority Borrowers Face With Traditional Underwriting.” “Researchers found that ‘algorithmic lending’ appeared to reduce the likelihood that the loan applications of borrowers of color are rejected-thus reducing discrimination in lenders’ ‘accept/reject’ decision-making process. However, the same study also found that ‘FinTech lenders [using algorithms] charge Latinx/African American borrowers 6-9 basis points higher interest rates’ than comparable borrowers - which is almost identical to the interest rate premium that minority borrowers face with traditional underwriting. In other words, the algorithms used by FinTech lenders are as discriminatory as loan officers.” [[Press Release](#), Sen. Elizabeth Warren, 06/12/19]